Although after understanding the issue a little bit, it's hard to agree with society.
Let's start with the "iron" threats
A specific chip can be exploited
- over the internet
- Through its "iron" channel - i.e. gsm/bluetooth/wifi/gps
The capabilities of the strictly iron channel are minimal.
The size/protocols will not allow to load any working payload, except for bluetooth/wifi, but such an attack obviously can not be remote, will have to get close to the victim at least 50 meters (with a good antenna).
Iron backdoors (not counting Wi-Fi/BT) are more of an anb capability, and strictly within surveillance, i.e. to receive and analyze "iron" data, but not to control the machine.
The software part is another matter
Given the installed software systems in every modern phone, surveillance and even remote control - a task quite simple for the manufacturer and for criminologists, who will refer to the manufacturer on occasion. To do this you need:- The software itself (system applications, pieces of the framework)
- network access (otherwise how to get information and transfer commands, logically).
How to fight it?
The recipe is not so complicated:- cut everything unnecessary (by the way, in BespalePhone about 2/3 of the original system was cut, just for this purpose)
- prohibit access to the internet for everything that remains (why do the camera/phone/contacts/gallery need access to the internet, it makes sense? These applications can perform their functions perfectly well offline)
- turn off wifi as soon as you stop using the wifi network (when leaving home, for example).
And, of course, all these points (1-2-3) are implemented in BespalePhone out of the box. As well as many other techniques and algorithms of anonymization, protection of personal information, prevention of remote access.
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